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ABSTRACT 
 The CIA’s initial regime change operations between 1953 to 1961 were marred by 
intelligence leaks and lacked critical mission assessments. In addition, perceptions held 
by top-level decision makers were so distorted that unsupported claims of communist 
infiltration were made in order to support the decision to proceed with an operation. 
Three operations were conducted in the span of eight years with nearly indistinguishable 
similarity, and the third operation resulted in failure. It was only after that failure that 
investigations revealed the extent of the problem. After examining these three cases, this 
thesis concludes that the accrual of misperceptions with regard to intelligence and 
unexamined mission tactics led to the failure at the Bay of Pigs. 
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I. GETTING IT WRONG: 
A CRITIQUE OF THE CIA’S EARLY OVERT OPERATIONS 
A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
Shortly after its inception in 1947, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) undertook 
operations to overthrow the democratically elected leaders of Iran and Guatemala—
Mohammad Mosaddeq and Jacobo Árbenz. Both operations nearly failed, yet both were 
touted as successful and were lauded for being heroic since hardly anyone had died.1  In 
the absence of after-action reviews for both missions, policies and practices became 
entrenched and repeated leading up to the 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion which ended in 
disastrous failure. Those policies and practices were the result of a combination of cold 
war ideology and widespread misperceptions regarding the prevalence of communist 
infiltration. 
That combination resulted in operations to eradicate any semblance of perceived 
communist threat in each country, despite intelligence which broadly indicated minimal 
communist presence or influence. This study will show that the distorted perceptions held 
by high-level U.S. officials were self-serving in the face of contradictory intelligence, and 
after the success of TPAJAX, the CIA’s first covert regime change operation, those 
officials were “flushed with its triumph” and “about to overthrow another country.”2 
With this in mind, this thesis will provide an analysis of the operations in Iran and 
Guatemala, TPAJAX and PBSUCCESS, and identify the operational blunders as they 
apply to each and how the accrual and repetition of such mistakes ultimately factored into 
the failed operation to overthrow Fidel Castro. Each case study will consider the history, 
the operational details, and attempt to identify the carryover of practices identified to be 
faulty. On a broader scale, this thesis will seek to identify the leadership approaches which 
 
1 Kermit Roosevelt, Countercoup: The Struggle for the Control of Iran (New York: McGraw-Hill, 
1979), ix. 
2 Stephen E. Ambrose and Richard H. Immerman, Ike’s Spies: Eisenhower and the Espionage 
Establishment, 1st ed. (Garden City, N.Y: Doubleday, 1981), 224. 
2 
were responsible for the continuation of such deleterious practices and whether attempts to 
adjust planning and practices were suggested and ignored. 
B. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES 
U.S. interventions around the world generate substantial, long-lasting 
consequences. This analysis will not venture into the realm of whether the reviewed cases 
were right or wrong in a foreign policy sense, however the Iranian revolution of 1979, the 
Guatemalan civil war, and the rise of Fidel Castro warrant further examination in order to 
fully understand the repercussions of such undertakings. Take-aways from honest, critical 
post-mission analyses are essential and provide invaluable insights that serve to improve 
the tactical acuity of the armed forces, and, at times, simultaneously provide intelligence 
that can inform the advisability of foreign policy decisions. As Richard Immerman states 
in his book The CIA in Guatemala, “the effects … continue, and subsequent events suggest 
that the United States success in 1954 may turn out to be one of its most serious failures.”3 
Each of the cases covered occurred during the Cold War period and the specter of 
creeping communism cannot be overstated as an impetus for their execution. But that is 
only part of the background. In Iran, Mosaddeq had recently nationalized the country’s oil 
which had serious economic repercussions for Britain. Documents from the CIA archives 
released as recently as 2017 indicate that Britain had reached out to the U.S. for assistance, 
was initially denied, and reached out a second time but instead claimed that Mossadegh 
was entering the Soviet orbit.4 In Guatemala, Árbenz instituted sweeping land and labor 
reforms, ultimately seizing over 1.4 million acres by 1954.5 There was a heightened 
tendency for policy makers in the U.S. government and CIA leadership to view any 
revolutionary government reforms as a sign of communist influence, which resulted in an 
 
3 Richard H. Immerman, The CIA in Guatemala: The Foreign Policy of Intervention, 1st ed., (Austin: 
University of Texas Press, 1982), ix. 
4 1953 Iran Coup: New U.S. Documents Confirm British Approached U.S. in Late 1952 About 
Ousting Mosaddeq, https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-book/iran/2017-08-08/1953-iran-coup-new-us-
documents-confirm-british-approached-us-late#_ftnref1 [accessed 02 Sep 2020]. 
5 Piero Gleijeses, “The Agrarian Reform of Jacobo Arbenz,” Journal of Latin American Studies 21, 
no. 3 (1989): 465. 
3 
enthusiastic inclination towards regime overthrow. However, “during the period of cold 
war tension,” Richard Immerman concludes, “neither the United States government nor the 
public could understand”6 that not every attempt at reform was indicative of communist 
infiltration. 
Numerous missteps and leaks plagued both the Iranian and Guatemalan operations 
which nearly derailed them. Ultimately, the planning of the Bay of Pigs operation was 
advanced despite similar missteps and known intelligence leaks. That cavalier approach to 
such significant operations quickly resulted in failure and laid bare the U.S.’s role in the 
invasion, with lasting and substantial repercussions. While it is not necessary to invoke 
John Quincy Adams’s advice about not going “abroad in search of monsters to destroy”,7 
it should be readily apparent that operational planning needs to be thorough and well-
developed as well as justifiable and based upon sound intelligence assessments. 
The primary issue that arose in the study of these historical military operations is 
that of their success or failure. Opinions regarding the case studies within range from 
alarmists who see any effort to thwart the spread of communism as justified, no matter the 
cost, to pragmatists such as Nick Cullather who, given access to the CIA documentary 
archive, concluded that a number of mistakes were made to include misunderstood 
intelligence that provided justification for the operation.8 Nearly three-quarters-of-a-
century have passed since these operations and vast amounts of historical records have 
been declassified, which confirms that Cullather’s assessment (and others who have had 
similar access and come to similar conclusions regarding the Iranian and Cuban operations) 
carries significant weight. On the contrary, many argue that had the operations not 
proceeded then Iran would have been trapped behind the Iron Curtain and that Soviet-style 
 
6 Richard H. Immerman, The CIA in Guatemala: The Foreign Policy of Intervention, 1st ed., (Austin, 
TX: University of Texas Press, 1982), ix.  
7 Benjamin H. Friedman, and A. Trevor Thrall, U.S. Grand Strategy in the 21st Century: The Case for 
Restraint. New York: Routledge, 2018. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315111773. 
8 Nick Cullather, Secret History: The CIA’s Classified Account of Its Operations in Guatemala, 1952–
1954 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1999). 
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communism would have firmly established itself on the doorstep of the U.S. In any case, 
the topic is still debated. 
A second issue is that this study is focused on operations that were undertaken 
under unique Cold War circumstances which inevitably affected all aspects of international 
interaction. As such, arguments against conclusions derived in this study center around the 
idea that there existed a sort of hive mind approach to the perceived threat of the spread of 
communism which resulted in a less critical operational environment. The conclusion 
involving a justification akin to a wholesale discharge of the responsibility in legal cases 
involving a heat of passion defense. This study acknowledges the existence of such opinion 
and engages it, rather than attempting to isolate or disregard it. 
A final issue that was not found to contribute to the conclusion of this study 
involves the complication of the threat of nuclear war. The nuclear threat enhances the 
severity of situations in ways that no other aspect had before; there was no precedent to 
refer to and there was no established strategy for dealing with such a crisis. While the Bay 
of Pigs operation proved to be a watershed moment, the nuclear option was not in play 
which prevented such “a crucible in which a president and his administration are tested as 
nowhere else.”9 
Throughout this thesis, each case study will examine how the decision-making 
process may have been affected by various conceptual frames over a nearly decade-long 
span. For structural purposes, this will be addressed as individual case studies with a focus 
on lack of variation of perception among the actors involved, carry-over of policy 
objectives, and the combined effects of which ultimately resulted in the mission failure at 
the Bay of Pigs. With regard to the variation of perception among the actors involved, this 
thesis will show that there was an inability to adjust policy as a result of the perceptions 
that were held by top-level decision-makers and that resulted in the carry-over of 
operational methods across each mission. Conversely, it may be the case that the Cold War 
perception was overwhelming and a substantial strategic failure was necessary in order for 
adjustments to occur. 
 
9 L.W. Koenig, The Chief Executive (Bloomington, Indiana: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1964), 371. 
5 
Regarding the carry-over of policy objectives, this study will show that the policies 
and approaches towards each operation involved little to no variation and that imbued a 
dangerous level of overconfidence. Each successive operation involved strategic and 
tactical similarities despite the unique situational variation in each country. Each 
successive operation involved increasing occurrences of strategic and tactical mistakes. 
Lastly, with regard to the cause of failure at the Bay of Pigs, this study hypothesizes that 
the combination of the stagnant situational perception and strategic and tactical 
overconfidence likely resulted in the increase of operational blunders. 
While these aspects taken individually may have had enough of an impact to have 
been the causal factor in the Bay of Pigs failure, the combined effect is estimated to have 
been insurmountable. The conclusion will make the case that, in order to avert such 
operational pitfalls, the identification of similar potential errors is essential. History has 
shown that this is the case, despite slight variations of circumstances, and that it is not only 
the lives of the men and women involved on the ground that are at stake, but the continued 
stability of the international system. 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A review of these cases can be examined using the existing literature from two 
combined vantage points: the first involving the organizational policies and practices 
utilized, retained, and repeated in each successive mission; and the second on the 
organizational learning aspect that led up to the Bay of Pigs operation. These two aspects 
provide a framework in which the research questions asked in this thesis can be answered 
by identifying the specific circumstances during each case study, then applying learning 
concepts to identify possible shortcomings. 
The first case study will cover the joint operation between the Secret Intelligence 
Service (SIS, also known as MI6) and the CIA which developed and executed Operation 
Ajax in an effort to overthrow the prime minister of Iran, Dr. Mohammad Mosaddeq. 
Among sundry other decisions, Mosaddeq nationalized the Iranian oil operations which 
drew the ire of the British government and led them to approach the United States to assist 
in a plan to overthrow him. President Harry Truman refused and urged the British to 
6 
continue to try for a peaceful resolution. Dwight Eisenhower initially shirked the issue but 
was quickly convinced to authorize the operation in an effort to prevent Iran from being 
overrun by communists.10 The exaggeration of a communist threat became a sort of 
pathological policy component of each of the cases in review. 
The election of Eisenhower brought in brothers John Foster Dulles and Allen Dulles 
as secretary of state and CIA director, respectively. Both men advocated for U.S. 
intervention and the decision to move ahead with the coup was approved shortly after the 
presidential transition. Despite intelligence estimates that Mosaddeq had refused 
collaboration with Iran’s communist Tudeh party, that the Soviet Union was unlikely to 
invade,11 and that any coup attempt was unlikely to succeed,12 embassy situation reports 
began to report escalation and the operation moved ahead. Information leaks caused the 
failure of the initial coup attempt on August 15, and even CIA leadership recommended 
that the attempt be aborted. However, the CIA officer in charge, Kermit Roosevelt, refused, 
and after a second attempt on August 20, 1953, Mosaddeq surrendered.13 The “almost 
alarmingly enthusiastic” opinion of the outcome led to the estimation that the covert option 
could be an effective weapon in future operations.14 
Within weeks of the Iranian operation, the CIA offered Kermit Roosevelt command 
of another coup in development that would depose Guatemalan President Jacobo Árbenz.15 
Árbenz was elected president in 1951 having relied heavily on a land reform platform, 
 
10 Kermit Roosevelt, Countercoup: The Struggle for the Control of Iran (New York: McGraw-Hill, 
1979), 2. 
11 Artemy M Kalinovsky, “The Soviet Union and Mosaddeq: A Research Note,” Iranian Studies: Iran 
and the Cold War 47, no. 3 (2014): 401–18, https://doi.org/10.1080/00210862.2014.880633. 
12 United States Central Intelligence Agency, The Iranian Situation 1953., 
http://libproxy.nps.edu/login?url=https://search-proquest-
com.libproxy.nps.edu/docview/1679072162?accountid=12702, 3–5 [accessed 02 Sep 2020]. 
13 Mark J. Gasiorowski, Mohammad Mosaddeq and the 1953 Coup in Iran, (Syracuse: Syracuse 
University Press, 2004), 252–253. 
14 Kermit Roosevelt, Countercoup: The Struggle for the Control of Iran (New York: McGraw-Hill, 
1979), 209. 
15 Roosevelt, 210. 
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particularly the agrarian reform bill Decree 900.16 The crux of that bill was the transfer of 
uncultivated portions of plantations that were larger than 672 acres to the local peasantry. 
This proved unacceptable to some, particularly the United Fruit Company, which owned 
approximately one-fifth of the country’s arable land, and which had “undervalued its land 
for years in order to reduce its tax liability.”17 
United Fruit responded by invoking the alliances of its members within the U.S. 
government, to include the Dulles brothers and a slew of other prominent, high-ranking 
officials. The Eisenhower administration declared the reforms to be proof of communist 
influence in Guatemala and that the Árbenz government posed a significant enough threat 
to warrant covert action.18 Despite it being “impossible to produce evidence clearly tying 
the Guatemalan government to Moscow,” John Foster Dulles and colleagues carried out 
the coup “based on our deep conviction that such a tie must exist.”19 For the Dulles 
brothers and other United Fruit beneficiaries, regime change in Guatemala was a goal 
before the transition into office and the success of the Iranian operation had provided them 
with a model on which to base the action. 
Fidel Castro’s patchwork of guerrilla forces rolled into Havana on January 8, 1959. 
This was worrisome for the U.S. which had no real idea of the political direction in which 
Castro wanted to take the country. While the fear of communism was ubiquitous, Castro 
had not proclaimed any allegiance to the ideology, and had only espoused a nationalist 
fervor at that point; his Marxist-Leninist affiliation came later.20 President John F. 
Kennedy made an effort to acknowledge the injustices that had been endured by the Cuban 
people under the Batista regime, but the gesture was hollow as plans for CIA intervention 
 
16 George Black, Garrison Guatemala (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1984), 13. 
17 Stephen C. Schlesinger, Bitter Fruit: The Story of the American Coup in Guatemala, (Cambridge, 
Mass: Harvard University, David Rockefeller Center for Latin American Studies, 2005), 54. 
18 Stephen. Kinzer, Overthrow: America’s Century of Regime Change from Hawaii to Iraq, 1st 
paperback ed. (New York: Times Books/Henry Holt, 2007), 133. 
19 Kinzer, 337. 
20 Lawrence Freedman, Kennedy’s Wars: Berlin, Cuba, Laos, and Vietnam (New York; Oxford 
University Press, 2000), 123. 
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had been in development prior to Kennedy’s inauguration. In U.S. Presidents and Latin 
American Interventions, Michael Grow states that it was precisely the threat of Castro’s 
non-alignment and anti-Americanism that was the deciding factor in the decision to 
overthrow him.21 
For the third time in less than a decade, the Eisenhower administration had 
approved the use of the CIA to overthrow a foreign government. It was also the third time 
in which the CIA had resorted to the same tactics of assembling and training a force 
comprised of disaffected citizens of the target nation. Therein lies the source of the failure. 
Hubristic reliance upon past successful actions ultimately guaranteed failure. Intelligence 
estimates were ignored, in similar fashion with the prior two operations, and the “military 
and political assumptions underpinning the plan were questioned.”22 Among mistakes such 
as internal organizational failures including inadequate tactical training, Castro had 
prepared. Not only had he learned much from the operation conducted in Guatemala, but 
the group of Cuban exiles assembled and trained was no secret, and Castro was afforded 
time to prepare for contingencies.23 
With regard to the second aspect, Jack Levy’s simple question of whether “political 
leaders learn from historical experience, and do the lessons of history influence their 
foreign policy preferences and decisions?”24 provides a suitable lens through which to 
view the progression of each of the three operations. His definition of experiential learning 
involves “a change of beliefs” or “the development of new beliefs, skills, or procedures as 
a result of the observation and interpretation of experience.”25 When applying this 
 
21 M. Grow, U.S. Presidents and Latin American Interventions: Pursuing Regime Change in the Cold 
War (University Press of Kansas, 2008), 37–40. 
22 Freedman, Kennedy’s Wars: Berlin, Cuba, Laos, and Vietnam, 130. 
23 Paul P. Kennedy, “U.S. Helps Train an Anti-Castro Force at Secret Guatemalan Air-Ground Base: 
Clash With Cuba Feared -- Installations Built With American Aid U.S. Helps Anti-Castro Force at Secret 
Base in Guatemala,” New York Times, January 10, 1961, ProQuest Historical Newspapers: The New York 
Times. 
24 Jack S. Levy, “Learning and Foreign Policy: Sweeping a Conceptual Minefield,” International 
Organization 48, no. 2 (1994): 279–312, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818300028198. 
25 Levy, 283. 
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definition to decision-makers in each of the three cases, either individually or in 
progressive sequence, the variation of the lessons learned is further clarified and the 
persistence of the rationale through the Bay of Pigs disaster is illuminated. 
The decision to carry out TPAJAX was made despite intelligence assessments that 
contradicted the official end goal of preventing a communist takeover of the government. 
While the two conflicting identities of American and Soviet provided the conceptual 
environment in which the decisions were made, the takeaways were quite opposite. John 
Dulles saw a covert operations tactical model that could be broadly applied, while Kermit 
Roosevelt recognized shortcomings and declined an offer for command and subsequently 
resigned from the CIA “before the Bay of Pigs disaster underlined the validity of [his] 
warning.”26 
Jack Levy points to Philip Tetlock’s assertion that the difference between those two 
learning outcomes is based on each of their foreign policy belief systems. Those belief 
systems are “organized hierarchically, with fundamental assumptions and policy objectives 
at the highest level, strategic policy beliefs and preferences at an intermediate level, and 
tactical beliefs at the bottom.”27 He goes on to assert that the majority of learning is 
accomplished at the tactical level, and that repeated strategic failures are the catalyst for 
change in high-level decision makers assumptions.28 It was Roosevelt whose experience 
on the ground led him to request changes in the tactical realm of operational and policy 
requirements, while Dulles maintained his strategic assumptions until his death. 
Building on Tetlock’s system, Dominic Johnson’s premise in Overconfidence and 
War is that overconfidence is a human trait that plays a role in every day decisions and can 
be shown to have contributed to decisions to enter into conflicts despite a misjudged 
 
26 Kermit Roosevelt, Countercoup: The Struggle for the Control of Iran (New York: McGraw-Hill, 
1979), 210. 
27 Jack S. Levy, “Learning and Foreign Policy: Sweeping a Conceptual Minefield,” International 
Organization 48, no. 2 (1994), https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818300028198, 286. 
28 George W. Breslauer, Learning in U.S. and Soviet Foreign Policy, ed. Philip. Tetlock (Boulder: 
Westview Press, 1991), 27–31. 
10 
military balance.29 His three part theory that overconfidence is an adaptive evolutionary 
trait that has become prevalent in human psychology and thus is a contributing factor in 
wars aligns neatly with Tetlock’s hierarchy in clarifying the military and political decision 
maker’s aversion to changing their perceptions. Johnson is careful to point out that while a 
balanced level of exaggerated confidence can be strategic, too much can lead to disaster.30 
In planning and executing military operations, careful consideration of justifications, 
intentions, and situational awareness are paramount to mission success and the successful 
maintenance of the subsequent consequences from an international relations standpoint. 
All military operations involve a level of inherent risk, and it is not enough to rely 
on brute force and the record of past successes. It is the responsibility of those involved not 
simply to recognize possible problems that may jeopardize a mission, but create and foster 
an environment that is supportive of critical assessment. With an attentive organizational 
environment comprised of individuals that are equipped to identify and correct causal 
errors, to learn from experiences, and adapt or integrate those lessons as necessary, military 
operations will be better positioned for positive outcomes. 
D. METHODS AND SOURCES 
The primary method for analyzing the extent to which established organizational 
constraints factored into the Bay of Pigs failure will involve an historical examination of 
three case studies. In examining the operations from planning through post-mission 
analysis and identifying matching operational and policy aspects successively carried over, 
flawed traits can be identified and prepared for during future operations. In each case study, 
U.S. motivation for proceeding with the operations, operational missteps, and after-action 
evaluation will be tested against conceptual paradigms of learning and decision-making in 
an effort to identify flawed root causes in the decision-making process. As a result, the 
subsequent conclusions can be applied to future operations and recommendations can be 
made to prevent repeated errors. 
 
29 Dominic P. Johnson, Overconfidence and War (Harvard University Press, 2009), 3. 
30 Johnson, 6. 
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That said, the examination of the case studies does not involve U.S. military actions 
prior to the beginning of the earliest, 1953, nor is there any consideration of subsequent 
activities after the Bay of Pigs. Therefore, in writing this thesis, the assumption can be 
made that the conclusions arrived upon can be applied to critical analysis of any number 
of U.S. military actions provided access to sufficient information can be obtained. 
Furthermore, this study is focused primarily on learning and decision-making concepts as 
they relate to military operations, and thus non-military related concepts will play a smaller 
role in its development. 
E. THESIS OVERVIEW 
The primary method for analyzing the extent to which established organizational 
constraints factored into the Bay of Pigs failure will be divided into four chapters: 
• Introduction 
• Case Study 1: TPAJAX – Iran 1953 
• Case Study 2: PBSUCCESS – Guatemala 1954 
• Conclusions and Implications: JMATE – Cuba 1961 
The case study on TPAJAX is important as it establishes a baseline for the two 
successive operations. Additionally, it marks the first covert operation conducted by a 
nascent CIA. The operation details and post-mission analysis provide a unique insight to 
the initially disavowed regime change effort. The PBSUCCESS case study will review the 
motivation for the operation and identify the similarities between it and the Iranian 
undertaking a year earlier. This study is particularly important as the socio-political 
situation in Guatemala was quite different than in Iran, yet the justification for proceeding 
and the operation itself were nearly identical. 
Lastly, the conclusion will combine the similarities between each operation and 
apply the conceptual learning framework to explain how and why it resulted in catastrophic 
mission failure. The JMATE operation provides additional insight into the carry-over of 
the distorted rationalizations for policy and operational methodology. This section will 
12 
describe how the individual aspects came together and were ignored, even in the face of 
what should have been identified as criteria to abort the mission. 
The combination of Cold War ethos and the tendency to mistakenly identify 
nationalism as communism reinforced the perception that the threat was growing and so, 
therefore, was the risk. Additionally, the sequential operational successes reinforced the 
positive illusions that “we could walk on water everywhere”31 as a result of self-serving 
biases as expectations went unchecked. By studying the history of these cases and 
identifying and understanding the progression of mistakes, answers to fundamental 
questions will be posed and leadership will be better prepared to identify and correct 








31 Scott A. Koch, Zendebad, Shah!: The Central Intelligence Agency and the Fall of Iranian Prime 
Minister Mohammed Mossadeq, August 1953, 79 [accessed 15 Sep 2020]. 
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II. OPERATION: TPAJAX 
OPERATION: TPAJAX, the covert operation to overthrow Mohammad Mossadeq, 
failed initially. The second attempt succeeded only by luck. No “investigation or post-
mortem analysis of the operation to determine what the Agency did wrong and what it did 
right”32 was conducted. Yet, the TPAJAX model was used in subsequent operations in 
Guatemala and in Cuba at the Bay of Pigs. Inherent in that model were skewed perceptions 
related to the threats posed by the actions of foreign governments involving reforms that 
were being implemented. Accompanying the threat perceptions were measurable cognitive 
biases directly related to the estimated risk which help to provide an explanation for the 
misperceptions and, subsequently, clarification for the undertaking of such operations. This 
chapter will attempt to identify the decision-making processes behind this fateful operation. 
A. BACKGROUND 
World War II brought British military forces into Iran in order to challenge a 
possible German incursion, however the exaggeration of that threat was part of a larger 
objective.33 For decades, the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company had become increasingly vital 
to the British Empire, providing over £24 million in taxes annually and £92 million in 
foreign exchange, in addition to the vast supply of cheap oil.34 Securing access to that 
resource was both an economic and strategic imperative, and when Prime Minister 
Mohammed Mosaddeq nationalized Iranian oil assets in early 1951, Britain began to draw 
up plans for military action to achieve it. 
U.S. assistance to remove Mosaddeq was initially requested in 1952, but was 
rebuffed by the Truman administration, which considered the action untenable. Assistant 
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Secretary of State Henry Byroade presented the conundrum succinctly in a November 1952 
memo that “it would be virtually impossible to proceed with plans to overthrow Dr. 
Mosaddeq while at the same time giving him open assistance.”35 That assistance included 
diplomatic support as well as military and economic aid, according to a policy paper 
produced by the National Security Council (NSC) in 1949 (NSC 49). Diplomatic actions 
had, up until then, effectively prevented Soviet intervention, and that subtler policy 
approach was preferred by the Truman administration. 
However, the specter of Soviet influence was of increasing concern to the U.S., and 
NSC 54 had also concluded that “because of its resources, strategic location, vulnerability 
to armed attack, and exposure to political subversion, Iran must be regarded as a continuing 
objective in the Soviet program of expansion.”36 Additionally, U.S. intelligence had been 
collecting on the Soviet elements within the country and Iran’s communist Tudeh party 
since 1941 and the CIA had begun an anti-Soviet/Tudeh propaganda operation code-named 
TPBEDAMN in 1948. Despite the elevated scrutiny, a February 1952 CIA National 
Intelligence Estimate (NIE) concluded that the Soviet military was unlikely to invade, that 
Mosaddeq retained a stable popularity, and that the Iranian security forces could have 
prevented any Tudeh uprising.37 
Britain was not deterred and wasted no time to regroup and repackage their appeal. 
MI6 Officer C.M. Woodhouse attended a meeting at the White House during which he 
rationalized the tactic as “not wishing to be accused of trying to use the Americans to pull 
British chestnuts out of the fire, I decided to emphasize the communist threat to Iran rather 
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than the need to recover control of the oil industry.”38 That meeting in December 1952, 
caught the CIA off-guard, as the question of joint action to remove Mosaddeq was 
unexpected and one which they were unprepared for.39 Nonetheless, the ploy succeeded. 
Kermit Roosevelt Jr., President Theodore Roosevelt’s grandson, was the CIA 
operational officer who spearheaded what became Operation: TPAJAX. He worked closely 
with Allen Dulles, the recently appointed director of the CIA, during 1952 to establish the 
details of the plan which was presented in June 1953 to Secretary of State John Foster 
Dulles, Allen’s brother. Eisenhower approved the plan directly on July 11. With an allotted 
budget of $1 million, Kermit Roosevelt was in Tehran just two weeks later.40  
B. DISCUSSION 
Since the end of World War II, America has assumed an unprecedented level of 
global responsibility. Numerous foreign policy challenges accompanied that standing and 
those historical experiences could be expected to have produced a level of learning and 
intelligence with regard to repeat engagements. However, after the successful conclusion 
of Operation: TPAJAX, the perception that “we’ll think we can walk on water, 
everywhere” 41 seemed to be the primary lesson learned despite the caution towards 
restraint that Kermit Roosevelt had implored. 
The decision to proceed with the operation involved an enormous amount of risk, 
which is inherent in political decisions. Upon initial consideration, the high-level decision 
makers involved in the coup: Eisenhower, Roosevelt, and both John and Allen Dulles, may 
seem justified in their “alarmingly enthusiastic”42 reaction to the successful overthrow of 
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Mosaddeq. Afterall, the outcome was exactly what they had hoped. However, as Robert 
Jervis and other social and political scientists have found, it is a near certainty that actors 
overestimate their effectiveness, as well as their abilities and level of control of events.43 
In reality, it is far more likely that the decision to proceed with the operation involved an 
extreme level of risk that was at least underestimated and possibly disregarded. 
Acceptance of the risk involved in TPAJAX can be explained by two separate 
theories: the theory of positive illusions and prospect theory. Both theories predict common 
patterns in decision-making, specifically in high-risk situations. The theory of positive 
illusions suggests that risk assessments will be consistently biased towards a positive, self-
serving outcome in large part due to the expectation of an easy victory.44 Accordingly, 
TPAJAX was approved without thorough examination or consideration in less than nine 
months with minimal attention paid to the possibility of an Iranian response or fallout due 
to operational failure.45 Prospect theory holds that decision-makers “will be risk-averse if 
facing potential gains, and risk seeking when confronted with potential losses.”46 For U.S. 
policymakers writ large, any prospect involving the expansion of Soviet communism was 
a substantial loss, the prevention of which was worthy of tremendous risk. 
In contrast with other international relations theories, (rational choice and 
neorealism, for example) positive illusions and prospect theories are able to explain why 
misperceptions were present throughout the planning and execution of all three operations. 
Rational choice theory posits that actors in a conflict will identify and assess the possible 
outcomes and “act rationally in pursuit of what they believe to be their own best interest.”47 
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This behavior is also known as “utility maximizing.”48 When that framework is applied to 
these case studies, it can be assumed that the parties involved would seek to avoid fighting 
(risk) and attempt to negotiate (of note, it is not a requirement that negotiations be balanced, 
as the weaker party may be required to submit to greater concessions). It is prima facie that 
this was not the case, as these reviews will show, and rationalist arguments are not 
sufficient to explain the irrational behavior present in each. 
Neorealism has been given a dominant place in international relations theory since 
its conception toward the end of the twentieth century. In brief, the theory posits that 
conflicts between states occur as a result of the “enduring anarchic character of 
international politics”,49 resulting in constant power-grabs to ensure self-preservation in 
the absence of a central authority. Generally, relationships between the U.S. and the various 
states involved in these cases do fit nicely within Ken Waltz’s theory as they relate to 
variations among state power polarity.50 But, as Dominic Johnson points out, uncertainty 
regarding another state’s intentions is a constant, yet conflicts are not. Furthermore, 
“misperceptions and mistakes in evaluating power differences” are insufficient when trying 
to understand the “proximate causes” of a conflict as they “do not explain the source of 
[the] misperceptions.”51 In contrast, both the positive illusions and prospect theories 
provide an explanation for the misperceptions, or proximate causes. 
The primary aspect of the positive illusions theory is the identification of 
misperceptions that would bias a decisionmaker’s assessment of an opponent. Declassified 
CIA planning documents lend substantial support to the assertion that instances of 
significant bias were present in the operating environment both during and after TPAJAX. 
Examples of those records reveal that the success of the coup relied upon the support and 
cooperation of the individual that it sought to empower, Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi. 
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Yet, the agency’s assessment of the Shah was that he was a vacillating coward with a 
“pathological fear” 52 of British machinations and that “it is unrealistic to expect (the) Shah 
to sponsor a coup.”53 Additionally, a special study completed by the State Department’s 
Office of Intelligence and Research (OIR), a mere 16 days before the commencement of 
the operation, concluded that “opposition to Mosaddeq was weak, (and) lacked a plan”.54 
Nonetheless, Roosevelt was certain that “there was no prospect of failure.”55 
Experiments by social psychologist, David Dunning, have shown that the greater 
the ambiguity in character traits attributed to others, the greater the likelihood of the 
overestimation of one’s own relative abilities.56 While there can be no question of the 
disproportionate strength between the U.S. and Iran in 1953, the exaggerated opinions of 
American observers towards Iranians, and the Middle Eastern populace generally, further 
influenced the decision to proceed with the operation. There was a common tendency to 
stereotype the cultures of the region as having “a very uncertain quantity, explosive and 
full of prejudices,”57 and that their way of thinking was, at its core, centered around 
“violence, emotion, and ignorance.”58 For TPAJAX planners, the persistent notions of the 
“incapacity of Iranians to plan or act in a thoroughly logical manner”59 made it highly 
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susceptible to the threat of foreign, particularly Soviet, subversion techniques. As such, 
U.S. intervention was necessary. 
Heightened threat levels also serve to increase the prevalence of positive illusions 
which may also become extreme, thereby exacerbating a decision maker’s actions.60 From 
the U.S. perspective, the possibility of an Iranian collapse during the Cold War was a worst-
case scenario. Despite repeated studies conducted by the NSC, CIA, and the OIR between 
1949 and August 12, 1953, (two days before the initial coup attempt) that concluded that 
Mossadegh would likely remain in office and that the Tudeh party was too weak to come 
to power. In addition, the studies concluded that the Iranian economy was doing reasonably 
well and that the U.S.S.R. would not directly intervene. Nonetheless, the CIA received 
authorization to proceed. Prospect theory can be used to explain why. 
Prospect theory’s central goal is to understand why decisions made in situations 
involving elevated levels of risk are “based not on the individual’s predispositions,” but 
that “evolve [s] out of a cognitive response to a situation that constrains the way options 
are interpreted and choice is made.”61 Those constraints are the product of uncertainty. As 
individuals develop their judgements, they base them upon the assessment of probable 
outcomes. As Rose McDermott points out, not only is there no way to always know the 
likelihood of an outcome, in situations that have never occurred before, there is no basis 
upon which to reliably make a prediction.62 When probable outcomes are unknown, the 
uncertainty in choices increases. This was the condition under which the decision was made 
to undertake America’s first covert operation to overthrow a foreign government.63 
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Kermit Roosevelt’s account of the TPAJAX proposal meeting provides a striking 
example of the relationship between judgment and decision making. When asked to 
provide insight on the “ ‘flap potential’ what could happen if things should go wrong,” 
Roosevelt stated that he saw “no prospect of failure” if the requested support were 
provided.64 He further noted that, if the operation did fail, the consequences “would be 
very bad, perhaps terrifyingly so”65; an assessment of the magnitude of risk involved. By 
the end of the meeting, approval had been granted, although Roosevelt “was morally 
certain that almost half of those present, if they had felt free or had the courage to speak, 
would have opposed the undertaking.”66 We can assume that he did not include himself in 
that reflection. 
The “London” draft of the TPAJAX Operational Plan further highlights the authors’ 
judgements based upon their “intensive knowledge of the country and its people.”67 It was 
made clear from the start that the plan was hamstrung by the significant reliance on 
“Orientals” for its execution due to their “recognized incapacity … to plan or act in a 
thoroughly logical manner”.68 Nevertheless, they felt that they had devised a plan that was 
comprehensive enough to confer a “reasonable chance of success even if not carried out 
100 percent.”69 The authors reasoned that since no precedent for the sort of operation 
existed, the most serious weakness was that of the “Persian character,” and Kermit 
Roosevelt made it plain to Secretary of State Dulles that his decision would be based upon 
“no more than a projection of what might happen.”70 
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While ultimate approval of TPAJAX rested with President Eisenhower, the 
decision-making authority on the ground in Iran resided with Roosevelt. After the failure 
of the first coup attempt on August 15 and the Shah’s flight from the country, he made the 
decision to continue pursuit of the operation. Roosevelt had some previous experience in 
the Middle East, as he had served in Cairo during his tenure with the Office of Strategic 
Services (OSS, the predecessor of the CIA) and spent time in Iran and the Levant prior to 
joining the CIA in 1950. This prior experience with Middle Eastern affairs likely 
influenced an overestimation of his abilities and control of the situation, as Jervis suggests. 
Indeed, he reflected that “if they had simply reported what they were doing, London and 
Washington would have thought they were crazy and told them to stop immediately.”71 It 
is a near certainty that Roosevelt’s propensity towards risk increased as the possibility of 
failure had become much more tangible than predicted. 
In defiance of a CIA telegram which stated that they “regret we cannot consider 
going on fighting” and that “operations against Mosaddeq should be discontinued”,72 
Roosevelt and the skeleton crew of operatives regrouped and adjusted their tactics. It was 
a fateful decision, and it succeeded by pure luck. The operation could have benefited from 
the various levels of expertise of both “the Office of National Estimates (ONE) or the 
analysts in CIA’s Office of Current Intelligence (OCI) at [every] stage”,73 had Roosevelt 
not avoided them at every stage. In his study of the operation, Scott Koch pointed out that 
“exclusion damaged the analytical product because it prevented analysts from basing their 
judgements on complete information” and “harmed the analytical process because it 
impeded the creation of a valid framework for assessing future developments.”74 His 
observation highlights the inherent tensions and complications of covert operations. 
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There is a delicate balance between operational security (OPSEC) and the total 
number of those involved in covert missions. Specifically, operational planning requires 
informed personnel to provide as much relevant information as is available in an effort to 
negate as much uncertainty as possible, thereby providing decision makers with a well-
informed selection of available options. At the same time, OPSEC dictates that those 
involved in such an operation be kept at a minimum. TPAJAX was drawn up and executed 
without the integration of additional intelligence assets, such as ONE and OCI, that could 
have provided timely, relevant assessments such as the NIE or daily presidential 
intelligence updates, as well as an improved overall intelligence product. 
C. CONCLUSION 
Four days after the first coup attempt failed due to an Iranian Army officer’s 
haphazard disclosure of the plan, the second effort succeeded. Kermit Roosevelt’s quick 
decision to utilize media outlets to allow the Shah to proclaim the content of two fabricated 
decrees which proclaimed his dismissal of Mosaddeq and the appointment of General 
Fazlollah Zahedi as interim prime minister began to bear fruit on the morning of August 
19. Pro-Shah crowds began to appear throughout Tehran, many instigated by CIA agents 
or paid agitators, “needed only leadership”75 in order to succeed the second time around. 
The CIA’s Iranian agents provided it. 
Mosaddeq was taken into custody and military officers who were “known 
supporters of TPAJAX” had been placed “in command of all units of the Tehran garrison, 
seized key military targets, and executed the arrest lists.”76 CIA headquarters received no 
updates on the situation until the next morning when “someone burst in from the hall 
pouring out what at first seemed to be a bad joke.”77 Kermit Roosevelt’s explanation for 
the lack of reporting to headquarters was met with acceptance and even praise, but it was 
noted that “if the outcome had been different, a substantially different attitude toward that 
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action might have been found in many quarters.”78 The reception is nonetheless puzzling, 
as analysts at the CIA and policy makers in Washington knew about the capabilities of the 
U.S.S.R., Tudeh party machinations, Mosaddeq’s governing coalition, and the threat of 
growing communist influence. 
U.S. intelligence agencies had been collecting on the Soviets and on the thousands 
of operatives within Iran for over a decade before TPAJAX was undertaken. It was a 
foregone conclusion that they could have occupied the country easily and rapidly in a 
regular war, yet the assessments continued to conclude that an invasion was unlikely. Stalin 
was pessimistic about “Iran’s revolutionary potential” and between 1947 and 1952, Soviet 
policy was focused on the protection of its “economic interests and keeping a watchful eye 
on the British and American presence.”79 Subversive tactics were assessed to be the 
primary method of Soviet intrusion into Iranian affairs, and the Tudeh party was their main 
instrument. 
Tudeh party ranks waxed and waned during the post-WWII decade. Membership 
during the late 1940s rose to approximately 70,000 members,80 but by the time of the coup 
it had dwindled to an estimated 20,000 core members.81 Intelligence estimates indicated 
that the Tudeh party was an influential group that could mobilize large crowds and infiltrate 
institutions such as the military, and possibly Mosaddeq’s cabinet. Yet, there is no evidence 
of any U.S. concern being raised about party members having made any progress in either 
of those avenues. Regarding that level of cooperation, Mark Gasiorowski points out that: 
Because U.S. field intelligence suggested that the Tudeh was not an 
immediate threat to Iran, it seems that the decision to launch TPAJAX must 
have been made at higher echelons of the U.S. government. This decision 
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to seems to have had little to do with on-the-ground realities and much to 
do with the ideological imperatives of the period: the Cold War.82 
Mosaddeq’s government was never infiltrated by Tudeh party members. Officially, 
the party had been outlawed since 1948 after a party member attempted to assassinate Reza 
Shah. That status was weakly enforced and the party was permitted to organize and they 
are assessed to be responsible for the majority of strikes and demonstrations throughout 
the country during Mosaddeq’s brief rule.83 Assertions that Mosaddeq was dependent upon 
Tudeh support after several key ally defections were also unfounded. Those defectors did 
have substantial parliamentary influence and employed it to increase the opposition within 
that body, but Tudeh party members did not have comparable influence nor were they 
predicted to gain any in the next election. At any rate, Mosaddeq dissolved the parliament 
in August of 1953, shortly before the coup. 
The Tudeh was not the only Iranian political party influenced by communism, but 
it was the most influential, and Mosaddeq did have their support on some issues such as 
the nationalization of Iranian oil reserves. However, Mosaddeq frequently suppressed 
Tudeh activities such as rallies, had members arrested, and openly refused to join with them 
in a united front. This tentative balance likely benefitted Mosaddeq in some instances, such 
as large Tudeh rallies that may have intimidated non-communist elements. Yet, those same 
elements may have been spurred to act against his continued position for fear of a 
communist takeover. Whether or not this was the case is beyond the scope of this paper, 
but U.S. intelligence reports up to the week of the coup continued to assess that Iranian 
security forces were able to contain threats from rebellious uprisings.84 
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The official narrative that communism was spreading in Iran is equally transparent. 
Intelligence reports between the approximately eight-month period beginning with the 
initial British suggestion to undertake a coup in November 1952, and through Eisenhower’s 
approval of TPAJAX in July 1953 did not identify an imminent threat, but rather a 
precipitous decline in Soviet hostility and their “extremely unlikely” intervention.85 The 
intelligence reports remained consistent throughout that period and were not revised during 
the planning of the coup, “as we would expect if major developments had occurred.”86 
And so, the question remains, what was the dominant motivation for the coup? 
Gasiorowski drew two implications from the lack of evidence available to support 
the official rationale for pursuing the overthrow of Mohammed Mosaddeq. The first was 
that the U.S. made the decision to overthrow him based upon the evidence that a communist 
threat was so great that a takeover was imminent. The second, as a result of the first, was 
that the decision to proceed with TPAJAX “was premature, at best, to forestall a communist 
takeover. The evidence … does not seem to have warranted such dramatic intervention.”87 
What did it take for this shift to occur within such a brief timeframe? It was, simply, the 
incoming Eisenhower administration. 
With the administrative transition came a very different idea about how the U.S. 
should wield its newfound global influence. There was an immediate refocusing of the 
military, economic, industrial, and scientific power borne by a nation newly elevated to 
superpower status, towards the defeat of communism on a global scale. The CIA began to 
immediately claim full credit within U.S. government circles. For John Foster Dulles in 
particular, the import of the coup’s success was quite evident. “His eyes were gleaming; 
he seemed to be purring like a giant cat.”88 Dulles and President Eisenhower’s delightful 
satisfaction with the outcome of TPAJAX was due to more than just relief at the creation 
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of a pliant dictatorship in the fight against communist expansion. It was more than the 
substantially reduced price established for the export of 24 billion barrels of oil during the 
twenty-five years of the Pahlavi dynasty89 in a region “where the oil resources constitute 
a stupendous source of strategic power.”90 
The most salient result of the operation was how it had influenced the U.S. president 
and Congress of the “enormous power and resources” to the CIA, “a largely unaccountable 
and opaque agency to conduct a range of subversive and violent operations against the 
nations enemies.”91 This was an unlearned lesson. As the historical record states, the “CIA 
did not conduct an investigation or post-mortem analysis of the operation to determine 
what the Agency did wrong and what it did right.”92 Instead, the successful “king-making” 
effort left those involved with a feeling that “should never have ended … for it carried with 
it such a sense of excitement, of satisfaction and of jubilation that it is doubtful whether 
any other can come up to it.”93 
To maintain that jubilant high, the CIA chased the dragon across the globe to 
Guatemala, as plans were concurrently developed in an effort to repeat a nearly identical 
operation within the year. The agency had been officially identified as the civilian 
counterpart which was now responsible for clandestine activities. However, the 
seductiveness of being able to prevent, reverse, or halt events in the Third World cheaply 
and with impunity served to be too much to ignore. The certainty that “something would 
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turn up” drove Dulles’s confidence in proceeding with the Guatemalan mission dubbed 
Operation: PBSUCCESS; the name alone an indication of the sentiment. 
Roosevelt’s admonition against an hubristic reaction to the success of the operation 
went unheeded. The dubious conclusions drawn from the experience “seemed to herald a 
‘golden age’ of covert action”94 which captured the imaginations of U.S. officials and the 
public that spies and secret missions might be able to decide who might win the Cold War. 
Imagination gave way to reality as “American words did not match American deeds and 
‘our orthodox diplomacy [was] hamstrung and our reliance upon clandestine operations’” 
increased.95 While covert actions do confer certain benefits to international foreign policy, 
specifically the ability to influence another nation’s behavior without having to resort to 





94 Scott A. Koch, Zendebad, Shah!: The Central Intelligence Agency and the Fall of Iranian Prime 
Minister Mohammed Mossadeq, August 1953, 89. 
95 Koch, 79. 
28 





III. OPERATION: PBSUCCESS 
Planning for OPERATION: PBSUCCESS occurred in parallel with the planning 
and execution of TPAJAX. As will be evidenced, the same biased rationalizations were 
obviously present. However, the release of documentation associated with both operations 
reveals the degree to which the success of TPAJAX influenced the Guatemalan effort, and 
those directly involved with its approval. Kermit Roosevelt’s advice went unheeded, and 
the attempts by “Arévalo and Árbenz … to end [the] injustice through moderate reforms” 
was thwarted by the CIA which made moderation impossible.96 
A. BACKGROUND 
Jorge Ubico had been president of Guatemala for thirteen years in 1944. He is 
regarded as “one of the most oppressive tyrants Guatemala has ever known”,97 having 
even considered himself to “be like Hitler.”98 However, regional developments in 1944 
such as the resignation of the president of El Salvador and the overthrow of the Ecuadoran 
president led to an increase in Ubico’s authoritarian tactics in an effort to prevent such 
revolutionary growths from being established in Guatemala. He undertook various 
repressive measures, including appointing his supporters to high level positions in 
academia, suspension of constitutional guarantees, and widespread arrests.99 On June 25, 
he ordered police and military forces to intervene in a protest in Guatemala City; bullets 
tore through the crowd of people, killing two teachers. Six days later, Ubico resigned. 
President Ubico’s resignation was an unceremonious and hasty affair. He ordered 
an aide to select three generals who would form a junta and take over the presidency, and 
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then he exited the presidential palace.100 Of the three generals selected, General Federico 
Ponce proved to be the most ambitious and persuaded the congress to install him as the 
provisional president a mere three days later. Ponce promised free elections, and permitted 
opposition political parties and trade unions to be formed. However, to opposition leaders, 
civilians (primarily students), and a group of young army officers led by Captain Jacobo 
Árbenz, it was clear that the military remained in control of the country’s political future 
and that Ponce had little intention of relinquishing his new position. 
Ponce quickly reinstituted the familiar practices of his predecessor: press 
censorship, incarceration, and torture. Intimidation tactics did not have the level of efficacy 
that he had hoped and early in the morning of October 19, the small group of army officers 
and student supporters led by Árbenz attacked the presidential palace. Bereft of external 
support, including that of the U.S., Ponce quickly reached out to the Mexican embassy and 
was granted asylum. By the end of October, the U.S. State Department had signaled 
approval of the government transition by acknowledging that it had met many requirements 
for that recognition, as “programs and policies of the various rebel movements all appeared 
to be designed to attract U.S. support or at least neutralize U.S. opposition.”101 However, 
Ponce’s defeat signaled the start of Guatemala’s revolution, a revolution that united the 
“urban workers, the middle class, the landed elite, and the officer corps,” but while “The 
quest for democracy had united them, the definition of democracy would divide them.”102  
March of 1945 brought Juan Jose Arevalo to power as the first president elected by 
an overwhelming majority since the republic had gained its independence. Arevalo had 
spent a significant amount of his life as a teacher at the University of Tucuman in 
Argentina, and his musings regarding his political approach left many observers skeptical 
of his leanings. He considered himself a “spiritual socialist” in that he considered 
 
100 Piero Gleijeses, Shattered Hope: The Guatemalan Revolution and the United States, 1944–1954 
(Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 1991), 26. 
101 Cole Blasier, The Hovering Giant: U.S. Responses to Revolutionary Change in Latin America, 
Rev. ed., Pitt Latin American Series (Pittsburgh, Pa: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1985), 31. 
102 Piero Gleijeses, Shattered Hope: The Guatemalan Revolution and the United States, 1944–1954 
(Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 1991), 30. 
31 
democracy to be a social system and that the government should take steps to prevent 
special interests from blocking societal progress. This doctrine of “Arevalismo” set the 
standard for reforms that would take place over the next decade, up until the fall of Árbenz. 
One of the most substantial reforms was the drafting and ratification of a new 
constitution. It included over sixty provisions which ranged from the decentralization of 
powers divided among executive, legislative, and judicial branches, nearly-universal 
suffrage (excluding illiterate females), the establishment of governmental programs and 
agencies, freedom of assembly, and the freedom to form and operate political parties except 
those of foreign or international groups or communists. Of particular importance were laws 
that affected the labor code, which became significantly controversial for employers like 
the United Fruit Company (UFCO) and wealthy landowners. The establishment of a 
minimum wage, the right to organize, workplace standards, severance packages, and 
preferential hiring of Guatemalans drew increased criticism of his policies. 
Under Arevalo’s reforms, the urban middle and lower classes showed 
improvement; however, the rural masses, primarily Indians, remained largely unaffected 
by the changes. While it can be argued that the focus of the reforms were the city centers 
and the rural peasantry was too far removed from the new political establishment, in 
actuality, the landed elite, or latifundistas, prevented reforms from expanding to the 
countryside. “The conservative elements attribute labor unrest to communism, look with 
horror on social reforms and reflect that it was safer and easier to live during the dictator 
era.”103 The upper class remained unwilling to cooperate with the government, which they 
asserted had been taken over by communists, and instead plotted against Arevalo; during 
his tenure, he survived at least two dozen assassination attempts. 
Arevalo survived them all and complied with his promise to allow free elections at 
the end of his six-year term. During the election of 1950, he expressed his support for 
Jacobo Árbenz, who had served as his minister of defense, and “with the backing of all the 
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parties in the governing coalition, Árbenz’s election was all but assured.”104 Registration 
figures noted that of 404,239 votes cast, 258,987 individuals had cast their votes for him, 
out of a pool of ten total candidates.105 For the second time in Guatemala’s one hundred 
and thirty year history, approximately sixty percent of eligible Guatemalans had 
participated in a relatively free election. 
Árbenz, a career military man, made the audacious promise during his inauguration 
address that his administration would transform Guatemala from “a backward country with 
a predominantly feudal economy into a modern capitalist state.”106 A key aspect to 
achieving that goal was land reform, and with the passage of Decree 900, the Agrarian 
Reform Law, local councils were formed and the expropriation of uncultivated land began 
in earnest. For Washington, Guatemalans were failing to show the proper respect for 
‘friendly representations”,107 and for Americans in general, that type of behavior could 
only be explained by the ubiquitous threat of communism. By 1952, “officials in CIA’s 
Directorate of Plans had been working on … schemes to depose President Jacobo Árbenz,” 
because in their assessment, he, “Like Mosaddeq, was willing to turn a blind eye to 
communist machinations in his country.”108 
Distorted rationalizations were widespread during both TPAJAX and PBSUCCESS 
operations (planning for both was nearly simultaneous). While some accounts focus on the 
role of economic factors (such as the UFCO connection) or as collateral damage of 
U.S./Soviet Cold War machinations, those hypotheses “fail to emphasize sufficiently that 
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the [coups] typified the foundations of cold war diplomacy, providing a model to be 
emulated, and resisted, in subsequent years.”109 Anticommunist sentiment was so 
prevalent that “the pressures for conformity approached a kind of social tyranny” which 
prevented objective evaluation of the developing situation in Guatemala.110 
B. DISCUSSION 
The National Security Act of 1947 established the Central Intelligence Agency as 
a replacement for the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) and codified its charter rules. 
Under Sec. 503. [50 U.S.C. §413b] (F)(e) of NSA 47, covert action is defined as “an 
activity or activities of the United States government to influence political, economic, or 
military conditions abroad, where it is intended that the role of the United States 
government will not be apparent or acknowledged publicly.”111 Within the same section, 
Sec. 503. [50 U.S.C. §413b] (a), it is indicated that “The President may not authorize the 
conduct of a covert action by departments, agencies, or entities of the United States 
Government unless … such an action is necessary to support identifiable foreign policy 
objectives … and is important to the national security of the United States.”112 
PBSUCCESS was subject to the same misleading effects of positive illusions and the risk-
seeking behavior associated with heightened prospects of loss when it was deemed to fit 
within the parameters of that code and given the green light. 
The build-up to the operation progressed in near parallel to that of TPAJAX. Much 
of the intelligence that was communicated between the time of Arevalo’s inauguration in 
1945 until the election of Árbenz in 1950 indicates that communist elements within 
Guatemala in general and the political and military organization more specifically were 
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almost nonexistent. Assistant Secretary of State Spruille Braden, a fervent anti-communist, 
had his concerns assuaged after he contacted then chargé d’ affaires of the U.S. embassy 
in Argentina, John Griffiths, who responded that 
[Concerning] the suspicions that might be had about Arevalo … it is my 
considered opinion that anyone even reasonably well informed about his 
teachings, writings, and general activities would be inclined to pass over 
such suspicions as being so utterly without foundation as to call for no 
response.113 
However, reforms that began under Arevalo and continued under Árbenz had 
caught the attention of the Truman administration as well as the CIA, which assessed that 
the Guatemalan administration was being “distinctly unfriendly to U.S. business 
interests.”114 
It is imperative that the distinction of “U.S. business interests” is explicitly 
identified. In the same way that the Mossadegh administration, and Mossadegh 
specifically, was improperly accused of communist affiliations and tendencies after he 
nationalized the Iranian oil industry, the Guatemalan administrations of Arevalo and, with 
greater fervor, Árbenz were painted with the same brush. The grievances put forth by 
UFCO and other affected U.S. corporate interests that they were subjected to communist 
tactics are not adequate explanations for the decision to proceed with the operation. For 
contrasting example, a review of the U.S. response to the 1938 Mexican expropriation of 
its oil industry is apposite. 
In early 1938, Mexican President Lázaro Cárdenas created Petróleos Mexicanos 
(PEMEX), a national oil firm that assumed control of the Mexican oil industry, and 
restricted the operation of foreign firms within the country. Prior to this, the Mexican Eagle 
Company (a Royal Dutch/Shell subsidiary) commanded over 60% of the oil production 
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and Standard Oil Company of California (SOCAL) commanded another 30%.115 In 
response, President Roosevelt cautioned against hostilities in an effort to avoid driving 
them to “seek assistance elsewhere and/or into political and economic chaos.”116 
Negotiations continued for two years under the prevailing rationale that “the U.S. 
government and the American oil companies [had] everything to gain by helping Mexico 
… to get on her feet; and much to lose by continued and intensified pressure for cash 
payments or return to the oil companies of their oil properties.”117 In 1942, the U.S. and 
Mexico entered into the Cooke-Zevada agreement which provided a $29 million dollar 
payout to the American firms affected by the expropriation.118 
Eisenhower, and those directly involved with the conception and planning of 
PBSUCCESS, had determined that Guatemala was as close to turning communist as 
possible. The fear which that prospect engendered was the impetus for the intervention. In 
parallel with TPAJAX, once the threat had been couched in terms of an imminent 
communist threat, the perception of the Árbenz government grew redder and redder. 
Rational perspective was obscured and led to snap judgments that were not based on 
realities on the ground, as has been demonstrated in the previous chapter and will be further 
elucidated here. 
The CIA ‘Review of the World Situation’ from August 1949 made the assessment 
that “the (Guatemalan) government certainly does not have the ability, and probably does 
not have even the inclination, to side with the USSR … it will probably continue and may 
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intensify its opposition to certain U.S. policies during the present “cold-war” period.”119 
Nonetheless, it was the convictions involving communist infiltration and collaboration 
with the U.S.S.R. that were used as justification to proceed with both TPAJAX and 
PBSUCCESS. In the case of the latter, the convictions supplanted facts as evidence was 
“impossible to produce … clearly tying the Guatemalan government to Moscow,” and that 
“the decision … must be based on our deep conviction that such a tie must exist.”120 
President Truman’s adherence to diplomatic means to stave off the perceived 
communist threat applied to the western hemisphere as well as the near east. That does not 
mean that the option of covert intervention was not already being considered in Guatemala 
during the planning and execution of TPAJAX. Both he and his successor, Eisenhower, 
understood the importance of the relationships with Latin American countries, and 
espoused an “overarching objective of containing communism.”121 But it was after 
Eisenhower had come into office, along with the Dulles brothers, that a significantly more 
aggressive foreign policy approach was implemented. 
Within the first year of the Eisenhower administration, a “Proposed Talking Paper” 
had been developed that explained the new administration’s stance involving any Soviet 
aggression. The paper emphasized the need for the U.S. to develop “the capability of 
inflicting effective retaliatory damage” (the original draft used the word “offensive” rather 
than retaliatory), with the realization that it was “indispensable that the free world possess 
and maintain a capacity for instant and formidable retaliation.”122 For Eisenhower and the 
Dulles brothers, it was not enough to posture; examples of massive retaliatory actions 
needed to be made. Covert operations provided a method for the message to be 
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communicated while maintaining the appearance of anonymity, and at a significantly 
reduced cost. Fallout from these operations was not considered. 
From a tactical standpoint, the operations in Iran and Guatemala served “as 
warnings to others in the Middle East and elsewhere” that “if not punished, might have 
encouraged others to try … to move toward a social revolution.”123 The nationalization of 
Iranian oil resources and Guatemalan land may have been unfriendly to U.S. business 
interests, but each were presented as confirmation supporting the conviction that 
communist ties existed. In reality, conditions of the business arrangements in both 
countries were indisputably unbalanced in favor of Britain and the U.S., respectively. From 
a positive illusions position, willingness to proceed with covert military action reflected a 
level of enthusiasm and expectation that the end would justify the means, despite the 
presence of faulty assumptions which, again, were not scrutinized. 
The Agrarian Reform Law passed in 1952 (Decree 900) provided the Guatemalan 
government the ability to seize and redistribute fallow land on estates that were larger than 
672 acres. Additionally, it stipulated that “all uncultivated land in private estates of more 
than 672 acres would be expropriated; idle land in estates of between 224 and 672 acres 
would be expropriated only if less than two thirds of the estate was under cultivation.”124 
Any estates smaller than 224 acres would not be affected by the reforms. Those from whom 
the land was taken were to “be compensated with 3% agrarian bonds maturing in 25 years; 
the value of the expropriated land would be that declared by the owners on their tax returns 
prior to May 10, 1952, the day the agrarian reform bill had been presented to Congress.”125 
For the United Fruit Company, this “was a direct challenge” as it “owned more than 
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550,000 acres, about one-fifth of the country’s arable land.”126 would have to be forfeited 
as the company cultivated “less than 15% of it.”127 
Together with the United Fruit Company, International Railways of Central 
America and Electric Bond and Share had over $100 million (nearly $1 billion when 
adjusted for inflation) worth of investments and assets in the country.128 The United Fruit 
Company had been severely undervaluing their assets in the country for years and in 
exchange for the 234,000 acres seized by the Guatemalan government, they were offered 
$1.185 million — the figure at which the company had valued its land holdings.129 Of 
course, the offer was rejected by company executives as well as by John Foster Dulles, the 
lawyer from the Sullivan and Cromwell firm that represented all three corporations. 
According to Miles Copeland, a CIA agent who took part in the TPAJAX coup, 
Alan Dulles perceived himself to be a sort of character out of a spy novel.130 Kermit 
Roosevelt confided in him regarding his perception of the head of the CIA as well. Any 
opportunity that would have presented itself anywhere in the world would have proved to 
be irresistible to Dulles as he “wouldn’t be able to restrain himself - or us,” and that “Allen 
would give his left … well, let us say index finger, if he could go somewhere in the field 
and engineer a coup d’état himself.”131 As noted in the previous chapter, the after-effects 
of TPAJAX were enthralling. The “day that should never have ended”132 had set a 
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precedent and, with planning and preparation for PBSUCCESS well underway, induced 
high-ranking officials to chase the dragon in search of a repeat occurrence. 
Contingency plans were being drawn up by 1951, well before Decree 900, as the 
CIA worried that land reforms would provide an opening for communism in the 
hemisphere. The U.S. State Department hosted Nicaraguan President Anastasio Somoza in 
April 1952 in a recruitment effort that culminated in his agreement to coordinate with ex-
Guatemalan military officer, Castillo Armas, in an effort to overthrow the Árbenz 
government. Allen Dulles, then Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, received approval 
for Operation: PBFORTUNE to provide arms and $225,000 to Armas and his group of 
rebels in September of that year. However, by the next month agency officials had learned 
that Somoza had been bragging about his coordination with the CIA and had blown the 
cover of the operation.133 The operation was terminated. Eisenhower’s election served to 
revive it. 
In August of 1953, with Eisenhower’s encouragement and the “New Look” policy 
approach towards military posture and massive retaliation capabilities, cabinet members 
begin to re-examine the possibilities of covert action in Guatemala. The success of 
TPAJAX that same month served to bolster the confidence of planners, as evidenced by 
the operation’s title. By December 3, authorization of an initial payment of $3 million was 
made by the CIA. On December 16, the U.S. ambassador to Guatemala, John Peurifoy, met 
at Árbenz’s home to discuss the current state of affairs. This was the first and last meeting 
that Peurifoy had with Árbenz, in the next day he reported to Allen Dulles that “If he is not 
a communist, he will certainly do until one comes along.”134 
C. CONCLUSION 
PBSUCCESS mirrored TPAJAX in nearly every way. Planning proceeded under 
the conviction that Guatemalan society and military would respond favorably to the actions 
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leading up to the coup. The plan involved elements of psychological and political warfare, 
relying heavily on radio as a propaganda tool. However, Kermit Roosevelt’s warning that 
“we must be absolutely sure”135 about the assessment of the target country’s politics, 
society, and military conditions for operations to succeed proved to be immediately 
applicable. 
During TPAJAX, local radio stations played an integral part in conveying “well-
intended lies, or ‘pre-truths’”136 which were intended to rally supporters of the Shah to 
various points within Tehran. The assumption that the situation in Guatemala was the same 
was not only mistaken, but indicative of a dangerous arrogance that had developed within 
the institution. “Only one Guatemalan in 50 owned a radio, and the vast majority of the 
nation’s 71,000 sets were concentrated in the vicinity of the capital, in the homes and 
offices of the wealthy and professional classes.”137 One analyst within the planning group 
assessed that Guatemalans would “probably consider [radio] and authoritative source, and 
they may give wide word-of-mouth circulation to interesting rumors” that were 
broadcast.”138 
To add to the difficulties involved with the dissemination of propaganda, the 
“controlling factor” that would decide the success of the operation was the “loyalty of 
regular army officers.”139 CIA planners recognized that the rebel forces would have to 
confront far superior military forces and that “If Árbenz’s regular forces elected to fight, 
they could repel the invasion without any difficulty.”140 In essence, the plan relied more 
substantially upon the psychological impact of the impression of strength generated 
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through propaganda than the actual strength of the invading forces. This created a sort of 
regressive cycle where each flawed element of the plan relied upon the other flawed 
element, yet the ability to recognize the flaws was impeded by the general institutional 
memory of recent exploits. 
During TPAJAX, the support of elements of the military ensured the success of the 
second coup attempt. An assessment of the Guatemalan military in 1953 found that it 
possessed “an army of 7,000 … well-trained, and quite well-equipped”141 troops; the 
strongest military power in Central America at the time. For PBSUCCESS, military 
support was equally imperative. To achieve that support, planners needed to assess the 
likelihood of defection by some or all the officer corps, as the initial invasion force which 
consisted of only 480 “shock troops” was “never intended… to challenge the Guatemalan 
Army. Instead, it was to be used as another psychological weapon in the campaign to 
intimidate Árbenz and incite an army revolt.”142 
As planning proceeded, the reality set in regarding the role that the army would 
play as the operation progressed, 
[The Army] could affect a rapid and decisive change in the Guatemalan 
political situation if it were to take concerted action. Although a quick 
change of attitude is always possible, there is no present reason to doubt the 
continued loyalty of the Army high command and most of the Army officer 
corps to Árbenz. The Army would be unlikely to take revolutionary action 
[against Árbenz] unless the high command or a substantial body of unit 
commanders became convinced that their personal security and well-being 
were threatened… The Communists have little power of their own.143 
The conclusion to be drawn from this is that the intention was to drive elements of 
the military to treason. Months of targeted propaganda never achieved that goal, but it 
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served to convince much of them that the invasion forces “were U.S. proxies whose defeat 
would trigger a U.S. invasion.”144 
There is no evidence that a U.S. led invasion was a contingency, in fact, there was 
a concerted effort by Eisenhower and both John and Allen Dulles to “avoid the appearance 
of unilateral action”145 in Latin America. That would maintain the illusion that the U.S. 
was adhering to international law and maintaining plausible deniability for the operation. 
It also served as a “comforting conviction in the political and intellectual elites, and the 
press, and the Congress, and in the public at large that Guatemala was the aggressor in the 
United States, the long-suffering victim.”146 
Árbenz could have taken ample amount of evidence to either United Nations or to 
the Organization of American States (OAS), as security breaches had provided ample 
details surrounding PBSUCCESS. One senior agency official, Jacob Esterline, noted that 
the Guatemalan government had a substantial number of details, but that “they have 
decided to let the operation proceed undisturbed”147 until they were ready to present their 
case to the OAS. As a result of that revelation, PBSUCCESS was paused for two brief 
days, then resumed on the third. There is no evidence that indicates why the Árbenz 
government failed to present or even alert the international organizations to the evidence 
in their possession prior to the invasion on commencement on 18 June 1954. Fear of U.S. 
reprisal seems to be the most likely cause. 
On the day of the invasion, Guillermo Toriello, the Guatemalan foreign minister, 
brought a complaint to the UN Security Council seeking a halt to the hostilities that he 
attributed to elements of Nicaragua, Honduras, and the United Fruit Company; U.S. 
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involvement was conspicuously absent from the charges. Nonetheless, Foster Dulles was 
obliged to sign a French motion that called on all members to refuse to contribute to the 
rebel forces in order to maintain operational integrity. Despite his signature, there was 
“universal assumption of U.S. complicity in the invasion.”148 The operation continued 
unaffected. 
The invasion force suffered some setbacks, particularly when they were met with 
armed resistance. Desertion, death, capture, and no reinforcements led Castillo Armas to 
request additional supplies and 500 more men just three days into the attack. Árbenz and 
the chief of the Army, Col. Carlos Diaz, were not afraid of the invading forces, but they 
did fear that it may have been the precursor of invading U.S. forces. They planned to 
destroy the rebel forces by allowing them to progress further into the country before 
attacking. It was too little, too late. As the forward-deployed Guatemalan troops awaited 
the advancing forces, they shared their fears of the possibility of incoming U.S. support, 
and pondered whether the Marines had already landed. 
The week of June 17–24, 1954 proved to be strikingly similar to the second 
successful effort during TPAJAX. While there was no point at which the operation was 
aborted, success was questionable as a result of the lack of sources and input regarding the 
linchpin of the operation - the army elements. As of June 17, a CIA analysis reported that 
“So far as the Army is concerned, its preferred choice unquestionably would be to keep 
Árbenz,”149 and “As of June 20 the outcome of the efforts to overthrow … Árbenz … 
remains very much in doubt.”150 But on June 23 during a visit to the front lines, officers 
were found “cowering in their barracks, terrified and unwilling to fight.”151 On the 
afternoon of June 27, Peurifoy, Col. Diaz, and a few other officers convened to discuss the 
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removal of Árbenz. Just after 9 p.m. that same evening Árbenz agreed to resign his 
presidency.152 
His address was partially jammed by the CIA, and the text was censored for over a 
month. Nonetheless, Árbenz read his resignation over the radio for his countrymen that 
night. His assertion in the address as to the motivation behind the coup was partially 
correct: 
In the name of what do they do these things? We all know what. They have 
taken the pretext of communism. The truth is elsewhere — in financial 
interests of the United Fruit Company and other U.S. firms that have 
invested much in Guatemala. Time will show if what they say is true, but 
there are those who claim that Guatemala is the cause of what happens. My 
Government has been called Communist in nature. We have used every 
means to convince world reactionaries that what U.S. Government circles 
say is untrue.153 
Árbenz’s attempt at national reforms were a radical departure from what the country had 
experienced throughout its history. It was precisely that idealized liberalization that was 
misconstrued as communism and, once that illusion had taken hold, it rapidly metastasized. 
Over the next several days CIA agents gathered 150,000 documents, although little 
of what they collected related to “the aspects that we are most interested, namely the 
elements of Soviet support and control of communism in Guatemala.”154 The trove of 
documents was indicative of the gulf between the exaggerated perception of rampant 
communist infiltration in Guatemala, and reality. The CIA, embassy officials, and military 
attachés all knew that Guatemala was not under the control of communists. The most 
significant indicator of such subversion would have been the presence of communists or 
communist sympathizers within the Guatemalan Army, and they never “claimed that the 
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Guatemalan army was infiltrated by communists.”155 The sanctioned conviction that 
communists would attempt to gain control of the country was evidenced by the reforms 
that Árbenz had undertaken, as it set a dangerous example for other countries in the region 
that were experiencing similar social conditions. 
Grievances brought by UFCO triggered increased scrutiny, but it cannot be argued 
that they were the justification for the coup. The supposition is presented in Bitter Fruit 
that “Without United Fruit’s troubles, it seems probable that the Dulles brothers might not 
have paid such intense attention to the few communists in Guatemala.”156 UFCO certainly 
had connections at the highest levels of the U.S. government, and they were leveraged in 
an effort to end their perceived persecution. However, it was the pathological adherence to 
the notion that the U.S. was being encroached upon from all sides by the specter of 
communism. It was a battle of good versus evil, and evil was everywhere. 
United Fruit’s tribulations did provide the opportunity to present the aggressor as 
the victim, even though very few other countries regarded the communist threat as eminent. 
A relieved Eisenhower graciously thanked “the people of Guatemala [who] in a 
magnificent effort have liberated themselves from the shackles of international communist 
direction and reclaimed their right of self-determination.”157 Within the CIA, the success 
of the coup once again “induced euphoria: we can do anything if we want to!”158 and, once 
again the glorious success of the mission negated the need of a postmortem review. There 
was no attempt made to try and understand the conditions on the ground in Guatemala nor 
why Árbenz had agreed to step down so willingly, nor what repercussions might follow. 
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When a review was eventually conducted seven years later, in conjunction with the 
review of the Bay of Pigs operation, Inspector General Lyman Kirkpatrick informed Allen 
Dulles that “The Agency did a miserable job.”159 
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IV. CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS: OPERATION: JMATE 
The successes of TPAJAX and PBSUCCESS had served to affirm the perception 
that “the U.S. always wins!”160 The solidification of positive illusions had created a 
dangerous environment which left out the opportunities for debate and critical appraisal 
that could have identified faults in the invasion plan and possibly the motives behind it. 
President Kennedy “knew little of the strengths and weaknesses of the men who were 
advising him,”161 and the decisionmakers within the CIA brought their skewed situational 
perception and strategic and tactical overconfidence to this operation. It never occurred to 
them that they could not “provide the necessary objectivity and skepticism about their own 
plan.”162 
Critical elements of the intelligence community, such as the CIA Directorate of 
Intelligence, had been excluded from both PBSUCCESS and JMATE operations as details 
were increasingly kept compartmentalized after TPAJAX.163 Between the few high level 
decision makers retained from PBSUCCESS, it was decided that the very same operational 
approach, a mix of psychological and guerilla warfare, would be pursued. As Jack 
Esterline, CIA Chief of Western Hemisphere Branch, reflected in an interview given to 
Piero Gleijeses, “the Guatemalan thing stumbled to success.” and “It reinforced the feeling 
that anything the U.S. did would succeed.”164 The “repeated assurances of senior officers 
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who were not authorities on Cuba led to the exclusion of the true experts.”165 Being clever 
for another time had run its course.  
A. BACKGROUND 
In 1898, the U.S. intervened in the Cuban independence movement and helped 
liberate the island from Spanish rule. However, U.S. officials immediately passed 
legislation that allowed for the indirect U.S. rule of the island. U.S. officials voiced their 
concerns regarding the Cuban peoples’ ability to govern themselves, as some believed that 
Cubans “are children, and I am afraid they are pretty bad children, just as little qualified to 
govern themselves as so many youngsters.”166 In an effort to fulfill the promise of granting 
independence while maintaining Cuban subservience, the Platt Amendment was signed 
into law in early 1901. Not only did the amendment allow for U.S. intervention in Cuba 
whenever it was deemed necessary in order to “‘preserve’ Cuban independence and restore 
stability,” but the Cuban government was required to sign the amendment to guarantee 
formal independence.167 
In rapid succession, tariffs were reduced on American imported goods and “over 
90% of Cuba’s exports” were sent to the U.S. market.168 The result was a depressed local 
economy, which led to increased unemployment and underemployment as well as a 
reduction in wages. Social unrest accompanied these conditions, especially in the labor 
sector, and that sort of instability would have involved U.S. intervention had it not been 
managed appropriately. In order to manage the social situation, those Cubans elected to 
public office did what they could to settle that unrest and that often-involved violence in 
the form of suppression of protests and even assassinations. Nonetheless, labor movements 
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continued and economic crises during the Great Depression provoked many workers to go 
on strike. 
Throughout this time, Cuba was led by several different presidents who realized 
that deference to Washington guaranteed their mandate. It was not until a young sergeant 
in the Cuban Army, Fulgencio Batista, was able to reinforce actions taken by the 
government with military backing that the U.S. began to reduce its level of intervention in 
Cuba. As a result of his reorganization of the Cuban Army officer corps, significant 
military influence on the political and social system was exerted and “after 1936, the old 
political class never again attempted to regain power.”169 While the Batista-led 
government implemented several reformist demands including the implementation of a 
“national bank, support for agricultural diversification, land-tenure guarantees, profit-
sharing between mill owners and colonos [sugar cane growers], distributing public lands 
to peasant families, enacting labor legislation, and reforming education and public 
health”,170 it did not sufficiently eradicate corruption. 
Increasingly resolute agricultural interests continued to consolidate political power 
in the upper class to the detriment of the working class. In 1953, progressive opposition 
groups developed their own support and would have likely succeeded in bringing a 
candidate to power had the effort not been cut short. A coup installed the military as the 
preeminent political power and Batista at the head of the dictatorship. Elections were held 
the following year and Batista ran practically unopposed, as the single opposition candidate 
urged his followers not to vote.171 During the next five years his repressive actions 
increased and his refusal to relinquish power “undermined the moderate opposition and 
braced the radical nationalism of Fidel Castro, the Rebel Army, and the July 26th 
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Movement.”172 Batista fled Cuba on New Year’s Eve in 1958. Two columns of Fidel 
Castro’s rebel army arrived in Havana on January 2 and Fidel arrived triumphant four days 
later. 
B. DISCUSSION 
When Fidel Castro first assumed control of Cuba, his allegiances were difficult to 
discern, but it did not take long for him to realize that he would not find a supportive ally 
in the U.S. Eventually, he and Ernesto ‘Che’ Guevara, his second in command, solicited 
the support of the Soviet Union, which they quickly received. In this way, the approach of 
U.S. policy makers to prevent Cuba from entering the Soviet orbit and embracing 
communism actually set them on a collision course. 
John F. Kennedy was inaugurated on January 20, 1961, as the 35th President of the 
United States. As Eisenhower’s successor, “he retained the same people in all these key 
positions whom President Eisenhower had. Allen Dulles was there, ... the same Joint Chiefs 
of Staff. He did not attempt to move any of those people out. And these were the people 
who were around this table when they were making the decisions.”173 For Allen Dulles, 
the Bay of Pigs operation “would be much more effective than Guatemala” and it was “sure 
of success.”174 For those individuals retained and employed to pursue another operation 
to overthrow a foreign government, there was minimal productive learning taken from the 
previous operations. Robert Jervis states that such problems recur because: 
Decision-makers usually fail to strip away from the past event those facets 
that depend on the ephemeral context. They often mistake things that are 
highly specific and situation-bound for more general characteristics because 
they assume that the most salient aspects of the results were caused by the 
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most salient aspects of the preceding situation. People pay more attention 
to what has happened than to why it has happened.175 
As a senator, John F. Kennedy was aware of the plight of Cubans under Batista’s 
rule as well as U.S. imperial treatment of the island. In a speech made in 1960 while still 
on the campaign trail, Kennedy stated that U.S. “action too often gave the impression that 
this country [U.S.] was more interested in taking money from the Cuban people than in 
helping them build a strong and diversified economy of their own.”176 He prefaced that 
statement with a few statistics involving American corporate interests in Cuba which “at 
the beginning of 1959, [U.S. companies] owned about 40 percent of the Cuban sugar lands 
—almost all the cattle ranches—90 percent of the mines and mineral concessions, 
80 percent of the utilities–and practically all the oil industry—and supplied two-thirds of 
Cuba’s imports.”177 These economic figures are very similar in proportion to those in 
Guatemala when Arbenz began his reform efforts. 
Despite this acknowledgement, President Kennedy agreed that action to overthrow 
Castro was necessary, and authorized planning that had begun in January of 1960 to 
continue.178 However, as that plan developed, so did its ambitiousness. The initial plan for 
the development of a guerilla force within Cuba was scrapped in favor of landing a small 
force and providing it with air support. Near the end of that year, top secret internal CIA 
documents released in 1998 reveal that the plans that had been developed (including the 
one which was approved) were: 
seen to be unachievable in the face of the controls Castro has instituted. 
There will not be the internal unrest earlier believed possible, nor will the 
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defenses permit the type strike first planned. Our second concept (1,500 - 
3,000 man force to secure a beach with airstrip) is also now seen to be 
unachievable, except as a joint Agency/DOD action. Our Guatemala 
experience demonstrates we cannot staff nor otherwise timely create the 
base and lift needed.179 
Department of Defense support was not an option that Kennedy was comfortable with, so 
it was ruled out, further damning the operation. 
The review, conducted in 1979, correctly questions how the plan developed in 
November 1960 involving a “1,500–3,000 man force ... was envisioned by senior personnel 
as ‘unachievable’” yet it became “‘achievable’ in March 1961 with only 1,200 men?” In 
addition, security leaks from within the highest levels of the U.S. force structure led to the 
assessment by the head of the invasion planning that “Security already has been damaged 
severely.”180 Castro had also been informed by a member of the Honduran assembly “that 
thirty U.S. transport planes with supplies and former soldiers of the Batista regime had 
flown to the Guatemalan bases of Puerto Barrios and Retalhuleu.”181 Castro was thus 
provided with time to strengthen his forces in preparation for an invasion he could 
confidently assume was inevitable. The “miscalculations ... from the failure of Kennedy’s 
advisors to carefully consider the various options and contingencies”182 ensured Castro’s 
success. 
C. CONCLUSION 
After the Shah was installed in Iran, he instituted a campaign of widespread 
crackdowns on political dissent including torture and arbitrary imprisonment of individuals 
accused of being leftists or communists. Thousands were killed. This environment 
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persisted for nearly three decades before the Iranian revolution forced the Shah’s 
abdication of the throne and the creation of the Islamic republic. In Guatemala, Castillo 
Armas and his successors undertook a campaign of terror and repression that amounted to 
an all-out war on the population. Concentration camps were built to house the overflow 
from the prisons, and the human toll after 36 years of civil war is estimated at 200,000 dead 
and another 45,000 disappeared.183 In the immediate aftermath of the Bay of Pigs 
operation, John F. Kennedy sought to save political face by going to battle with Soviet 
forces in Asia and escalated the war in Vietnam. 
Positive illusions surrounding the intelligence assessments of opponents in each 
scenario directly resulted in the decisions to proceed with covert operations to overthrow 
those governments. In the absence of after-action reviews for both TPAJAX and 
PBSUCCESS, undue and dangerous levels of overconfidence in tactics and purpose 
culminated in the failure at the Bay of Pigs. Details of the three operations covered leave 
no doubt that the leadership in charge of approval and planning of the operations, including 
Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy, CIA Director Allen Dulles, and Secretary of State 
John Foster Dulles, were subject to such positive illusions. For John Foster Dulles in 
particular, “No distinctions among variants of neutralism, nationalism, socialism or 
communism”184 were enough to justify the exploration of more diplomatic avenues. 
Janice Stein implies that it is more difficult for those with entrenched beliefs and 
greater expertise with foreign policy and defense matters to alter their beliefs.185 She used 
Mikhail Gorbachev as an example of the contrary, that he was an “uncommitted thinker” 
who recognized that failure occurring around him required him to learn and to be open to 
learn. As it turns out, failure can be a great teacher. In this interpretation, the unreviewed 
planning and tactical approaches of the covert operations reviewed here helped to 
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perpetuate their application. This is not a promotion of failure nor is it a lamentation that 
operational failure should have occurred sooner. Rather, the takeaway is the fact that it took 
a failure such as the Bay of Pigs for detrimental practices to be revealed and addressed. 
It is imperative that leadership, as well as the subordinate cadre, are aware of the 
possibility of such mistakes. While the regime change operations reviewed in this case 
study were all covert, overt operations are not immune from succumbing to the same 
shortcomings. The Vietnam war and the second war in Iraq and Afghanistan are two 
examples from which insight regarding the rationale of the acceptance of risks involved 
could be garnered as they relate to large scale overt operations. With those two examples 
and in each of the cases covered here, as planners and decision makers progressed, “firmly 
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